

FILED
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
BRUNSWICK, GA.

2007 DEC -5 P 2:28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
BRUNSWICK DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER B. FERRELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

GLYNN COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER,

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV207-134

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, who is currently being detained at the Glynn County Detention Center in Brunswick, Georgia, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A detainee proceeding against officers or employees of government entities must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. In determining compliance, the court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that *pro se* pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).

28 U.S.C § 1915A requires a district court to screen the complaint for cognizable claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The court must dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (b)(1) and (2).

In Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical to that contained in the screening provisions at § 1915A(b). As the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to prisoner complaints filed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only where it appears beyond a doubt that a *pro se* litigant can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S. Ct. 173, 176, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980); Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in Mitchell interpreted § 1915(e), its interpretation guides this Court in applying the identical language of § 1915A.

Plaintiff asserts that prison officials at the Glynn County Detention Center gave him expired Tylenol and that they delayed treating his asthma attack. Plaintiff further contends that the Detention Center is overcrowded and that this has contributed to his medical problems.

Plaintiff names as a Defendant the Glynn County Detention Center. While local governments qualify as "persons" to whom section 1983 applies, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2022, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), a county detention center, as a mere arm of such governments, is not generally considered a legal entity subject to suit. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the Glynn

County Detention Center, as the Glynn County Detention Center is merely a vehicle through which the county governs and is not a proper party defendant. See Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim against a proper party, his Complaint is due to be **DISMISSED**.

SO REPORTED and **RECOMMENDED**, this 5th day of December, 2007.



JAMES E. GRAHAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE